WWI: Toward a Prolonged Ultimatum – Pt 3


In February 1917, after repeated failed attempts at peace negotiations, the German Empire embarked on unlimited submarine war, claimed to be the cause for the United States to later enter the war on the Entente side, in April. However, it was only at the beginning of 1918, that American troops were deployed on a large scale in France. The hope that England would give in within a few months as a result of the submarine warfare, remained unfulfilled. The war continued to be a standoff.

american troops arrive in England

In the spring of 1917, the Austrian leadership feared that the Danube Monarchy would not be able to continue the war beyond the coming winter. Emperor Karl I. and the new Foreign Secretary Czernin, thus urged Berlin for new peace talks to be held. Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg, confirmed his preparedness for talks, but he also said that at that point, the war could only be ended by the Central Powers submitting to the will of the Allies in entirety, but they would have to wait and see how the ‘Revolution in Russia’ (Jewish overthrow) would progress. There had been “workers’ unrests” in March, the Czar had been forced to abdicate, his brother had renounced his right for succession to the throne and the new Republican government had continued the war… quite a timely progression for the Bolsheviks.

In mid-April, the ‘Russian Council of People’s Commissioners’ offered a general peace, without annexations and compensations. In Germany, the Social Democrats immediately supported this offer. Even Matthias Erzberger of the Centre Party, who occasionally traveled abroad on behalf of the German government, supported it too. He was the main initiator of the resolution adopted by the Reichstag, on 19 July. With a clear majority, the Parliament expressed itself in favour of a peace of understanding, a lasting reconciliation of the peoples, against forced cessions of territory and, economic and financial rape… only an economic peace would enable a friendly coexistence of the peoples. The Reichstag also advocated the creation of international rights organisations, but the Supreme Army Command was against this resolution. Bethmann-Hollweg thought it inappropriate at that moment in time and thus lost the confidence of the parties advocating the resolution. On 13 July, he stepped down from office.

Imperial Chancellor Georg Michaelis 13 July 1917-30 October 1917

His successor, Georg Michaelis, avowed himself at the beginning of the debate about the resolution to the lasting reconciliation of the peoples and to a peace of understanding, but one which would have to safeguard Germany’s interests in Europe and overseas. Lloyd George, by then the British Prime Minister, called this speech “a sign of commitment to war and to achieving a false peace.”

On 1 August, Pope Benedict XV. called upon the warring parties to enter into peace talks. He advocated an obligatory arbitral jurisdiction for all international issues, the settlement of all territorial disputes in a spirit of conciliation, the mutual waiving of war reparations, disarmament and the freedom of the seas. This appeal had been agreed upon by ‘Nuncio Pacelli’ with the leadership of the Reich in late June. An official German comment was published only in mid-September, expressing the spirited hope that the Papal initiative be successful. This declaration was immediately handed over to the press. In doing so, the Reich government once again, like so many times before, made a public commitment to reconciliation. The Allies rejected the Papal proposition right away, Wilson did also – very decisively. On 1 November, Michaelis stepped down from office. The new Chancellor Georg Graf von Hertling, held no different attitude towards peace than its two predecessors.

In Russia, the Bolsheviks came to power following an uprising on 7 November. Vladimir Lenin (aka: Nikolai Lenin, Jacob Richter, Ilyin, Starik, Frei, Maier, Iordanov, Karpov, Mueller, Tulin etc.) the chairman of the now ruling Council of the People’s Commissioners, declared on 9 November in front of the Council Congress, that his government would offer peace to all warring nations on the basis of Soviet conditions, i.e. no annexations and contributions, and the right of self-determination to the peoples. This was also written in his decree for peace. The Central Powers agreed to his request for an armistice. On 4 December, a cease-fire went into effect to bring on a long-term and honourable peace for all parties and, the negotiations started on 22 December in Brest-Litowsk. During the session on 25 December, Czernin called the Russian principles a basis worth discussing. Should that happen, the governments of all warring nations would have to commit themselves to respecting them.

It was decided to ask the Allies for a statement in this sense within ten days. There was no response. The Western powers equally disregarded an invitation by the Russian Foreign Commissar to take part in the peace negotiations. A conversation initiated by Czernin, between an Austrian diplomat and the South-African politician, Jan Smuts, a member of the British Imperial War Cabinet, which took place in Bern in late December, also brought no results.

Vladimir Lenin addresses the people

The Central Powers’ draft for a peace treaty with Russia was very succinct. It demanded that the Russian government take notice of the will of the people, to give full sovereignty to Poland, Lithuania, Courland, and parts of Estonia and Livonia (formally called the Riga Governorate before ceded to Russia and then prior to WWI, it had been administered independently by the local Baltic German nobility, through a Regional Council – now divided between the Republic of Latvia and the Republic of Estonia).. Further articles regulated to reinforce once again, the treaties that were in effect before the war, the mutual renunciation of the replacement of war losses and the restitution of war expenses. The Soviet leadership was not united in their stance on this treaty. Lenin was expecting a World Revolution anyway, so he thought that the treaty would not be valid for too long, so he might as well just sign it. Foreign Commissar, Leon Trotsky (aka Leiba Bronstein), proposed to simply abandon the war and a majority was in favour of this. After returning to Brest-Litovsk, he first tried to delay the negotiations and on 18 February 1918, he declared in the political commission that Russia would not sign the treaty, but rather leave the war and hope that other peoples would do the same, without any official agreement in place – thus no ‘Official Peace’ to be obliged to adhere to. The Central Powers correctly judged this as a cancellation of the armistice, according to international law – and restarted their military advance. Soon afterwards, the Central Committee gave in and signed the treaty,  which included some new amendments regarding Central Asia and Armenia. Peace was concluded on 3 March.

WWI_MapFrom June to August, supplementary German-Russian agreements were negotiated in Berlin. There it was agreed that the Central Powers were to withdraw their troops from the Russian areas they had occupied. Ending the combat operations in the East, enabled the Supreme Army Command to deploy troops to the Western front. The German offensive which started there in late March, was particularly intended to hit British troops in order to make London more willing to talk. At first, the German army was very successful, but in early June, they came to a halt. Starting in July, the Allied forces successively pushed back the German troops. Bulgaria had joined the Central Powers in 1915 but in mid-September 1918, the Allied forces broke through the front there. By the end of the same month, the country had to surrender unconditionally. Now Hindenburg, the Head of the Supreme Army Command, demanded that the German government ask President Wilson to mediate an armistice. For this opportunity again, there was agreement in Berlin. The crown council decided on 29 September to introduce the parliamentary system in order to improve the odds for a beneficial peace.

Prince Max von Baden

Hertling was against this and stepped down… Prince Max von Baden then became the new Reich Chancellor. Thanks to his long-standing activities in caring for prisoners of war, he was well-regarded, even abroad. He had spoken publicly in favour of a League of Nations and in interior politics, he was ready to conduct reforms. On the very same day he was appointed, the evening of 3 October, he asked President Wilson, via Switzerland, for a peace treaty on the basis of the “Fourteen Points” of 8 January 1918; and in order to prevent further bloodshed, for the immediate conclusion of an armistice. The Danube Monarchy followed suit one day later, the Ottoman Empire soon after. However, Wilson delayed fulfilling this plea for an immediate armistice by five weeks, because the Allies first wanted to improve their military position.

w_32On 5 November, U.S. Secretary of State, Lansing, declared that the Allies were now ready for an armistice which would secure them the absolute power to enforce the details of the peace, which had to be accepted by the German government. This five week delay, cost the lives of some 10,000 soldiers. During this period, the Danube monarchy collapsed and in Germany, a civil war broke out between National Germans and Alien Revolutionaries, in early November. A Council of the People’s Deputies took over government. The armistice signed in the early morning of 11 November stipulated that battles should end at noon, 11 am British time.



Appreciation to Hans Fenske, Professor of Contemporary History, at Freiburg University (1977-2001) for all his scholarly compiled research.
Author of:
Der Anfang vom Ende des alten Europa (The Beginning of the End of Old Europe; The Allied Refusal of Peace Talks 1914-1919.)


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N. Jones is a Writer, Researcher, Historian and Literary Critic.


1914 – A Christmas Truce: Born in a Herdsman’s Shed

WWI: Christmas 1914


IWM3

Christmas 1914, the first World War had been raging for just over four months, but things didn’t quite go as the Leaders planned…

As the soldiers of both sides cheerily departed for the front-lines in France and Belgium, the politicians told them it would “all be over by Christmas.” But it wasn’t. Instead, on that first Christmas of the War, the soldiers – many of them volunteers from Ireland, indeed a great number of them probably hurlers and footballers – found themselves bogged down in deadly trench warfare, sometimes less than a hundred metres apart.

Compassion for Ones Foes

After heavy rains near Ypres, where the Germans held the high ground and the British the lower ground, English troops came out of their flooded trenches in full view of the Germans who expressed their sympathy and did not open fire on their soaked and vulnerable enemy.

ChristmasTruceW-1024x769

On Christmas Eve and Christmas Day 1914, something magical and mysterious happened… the killing stopped – and men from both sides gingerly left their positions and fraternised in the ‘No Mans’ Land’ between the trenches.

 

79684231_truce-5For that first Christmas away from home, family and friends of the soldiers wanted to make their loved ones’ Christmas as special as could be, under the circumstances that is. They sent packages filled with letters, warm clothing, food, cigarettes, and medications. Yet what made Christmas at the front really seem like the traditional festival, was the arrival of so many small Christmas trees in the German trenches.christmas-truce

On Christmas Eve, many German soldiers put up their Christmas trees, decorated with candles, on the parapets. Hundreds of the trees lit up the trenches. The British ‘Tommies’ could see the lights, but it took them a few minutes to work out what they were looking at. They could hear the Germans celebrating and calling out to them. In some parts of the front line, the two sides took turns to sing Christmas carols to each other.
At the first light of dawn on Christmas Day, some German soldiers emerged from their trenches and approached the Allied lines across no-man’s-land, calling out “Merry Christmas” in their enemies’ native tongue. At first, the Allied soldiers feared it was a trick, but seeing the Germans unarmed they climbed out of their trenches and shook hands with the enemy soldiers, even exchanging hats.

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This friendliness on Christmas Eve and again on Christmas Day, was in no way officially sanctioned, nor organised. Some of those who went out to meet the enemy in the middle of No Man’s Land, negotiated a peace their ‘Leaders’ seemed to have great difficulty in (or perhaps reluctance in) establishing… it was simple:
“We won’t fire … if you won’t fire.”

newxmasburyAnother opportunity undertaken by the truce, was to bury the dead. There were corpses out in No Man’s Land that had been there for several months. Along with the revelry that celebrated Christmas, was the sad and sombre job of burying their fallen comrades. On Christmas Day, British and German soldiers appeared on No Man’s Land and sorted through the bodies. In a few instances, joint services were held together for both the British and German dead.

1xmasMany soldiers enjoyed meeting the un-seen enemy and were surprised to discover they were more alike than they had thought. They talked, shared Christmas trees and family pictures, and exchanged Christmas gifts, such as cigarettes, puddings, wine, regimental badges and brass buttons etc.

xmas-gifts

Another wonderful example of the fraternisation, was soccer games played in the middle of No Man’s Land, where one such match between a British regiment and the Germans, the Germans won by three goals to two.



 

truceofchristmasvinciguerraThis impromptu, unsanctioned Christmas Truce of 1914, came shortly after the outbreak of war in Europe – much to the anger of the ‘Chain of Command’ who, in many instances, threatened repercussions for lack of discipline. Numerous Officers ordered their artillery to open fire on their fraternising troops in no-mans-land. On none of these occasions did the artillery obey orders. There are numerous complaints on record by officers shocked at the total breakdown of discipline as men point blank refused orders to open fire on their own soldiers, who were mingling with the enemy in no-mans-land – on Christmas Day. The reinstatement of combat was ordered and in various areas of the front, recommenced the day after Christmas, others after New Year and on the Eastern front a week later again. It was the last example of the supposedly outdated notion of chivalry between enemies in warfare. It was never repeated. An Easter Sunday Truce was attempted by German units in 1915, but they were suppressed by British artillery fire. Future attempts at holiday ceasefires were quashed by Officers, with threats of disciplinary action, court martial, Treason, the death penalty and so, became somewhat of a legend…
canadian-and-german-cigaretteBut it served as heartening proof and showed, however brief, that even in the most hell-like of conditions, that beneath the brutal clash of weapons, soldiers’ essential goodness and humanity prevails… and with the spirit of Christmas and what it represents, can overcome the enmity and bring people together.

1xmas1

The Irish poet, Thomas Kettle, was killed in the War in September 1916. He captured that Christmas spirit in a poem he wrote to his little daughter, Betty, shortly before he died:

“So, here while the mad guns curse overhead,
And tired men sigh with mud for couch and floor,
Know that we fools, now with the foolish dead,
Died not for flag, nor King, nor Emperor –
But for a dream, born in a herdsman’s shed,
And for the secret scripture of the poor.”

Christmas Truce

Undermining Propaganda

The French government was the first to severely censor any reports on what they called “fraternisation with the enemy.” In a letter dated 7 December 1914, Charles De Gaulle expressed his dismay at fraternisation with the enemy, where French and German troops had exchanged newspapers and recovered their dead and organised burial parties in no-mans-land. French General d’Urbal, expressed alarm over soldiers staying too long in the same sector becoming friendly with their enemies, to the extent that they were conducting conversations between the lines and even visiting one another’s trenches!
Political pressure was brought to bear in order to censor all reports of the event from mainstream history books for decades. For years the extraordinary event was known only by word of mouth from participants. The damage caused by the Christmas Truce to propaganda campaigns to demonise the enemy, was regarded as a serious threat to the war. It has taken decades to unearth the details of the fascinating events surrounding Christmas 1914.

The soccer match was re-enacted recently by English, German and other NATO troops in Kabul; midway through the match, in perfect synchronicity, play on the make-shift pitch had to be postponed for the landing of a Black Hawk helicopter carrying John McCain, visiting American troops.  Never was John McCutcheon’s great song about the Christmas Truce more timelessly and heart-breakingly true.

“Twas Christmas in the trenches, where the frost so bitter hung
The frozen fields of France were warmed as songs of peace were sung
For the walls they’d kept between us to exact the work of war
Had been crumbled and were gone for evermore.

My name is Francis Tolliver, in Liverpool I dwell
Each Christmas come since World War I I’ve learned its lessons well
That the ones who call the shots won’t be among the dead and lame
And on each end of the rifle we’re the same.”

“Without an Enemy, there can be no war.”

the power of peace 1914

 

christmas-truce




EmilyHobhouse
Emily Hobhouse

The famous Englishwoman, Emily Hobhouse, who had exposed to the world the horrors of Lord Kitchener’s scorched earth campaign against the Boer Republics of the Transvaal and Orange Free State and the horrors of the British concentration camps in South Africa, was the most prominent campaigner against British involvement in the First World War.

Open Christmas Letter

Emily Hobhouse authored the Open Christmas Letter calling for peace. 101 British women signed Emily’s Open Christmas Letter which was endorsed by 155 prominent German and Austrian women in response. Under the heading: “On Earth Peace, Goodwill towards Men”, Emily Hobhouse wrote: “Sisters: The Christmas message sounds like mockery to a world at war, but those of us who wished, and still wish, for peace, may surely offer a solemn greeting to such of you who feel as we do.” She mentioned that “as in South Africa during the Anglo Boer War (1899-1902), the brunt of modern war falls upon non-combatants and the conscience of the world cannot bear the sight.”

Christmas Hastens Peace

“Is it not our mission to preserve life? Do not humanity and common sense alike prompt us to join hands with the women… and urge our rulers to stave off further bloodshed?… May Christmas hasten that day…”

Female Solidarity

The German Mothers responded: “To our English Sisters, sisters of the same race, our warm and heartfelt thanks for Christmas greetings… women of the belligerent countries, with all faithfulness, devotion and love to their country, can go beyond it and maintain true solidarity with the women of other belligerent nations, that really civilised women never lose their humanity…”

Love for One’s Enemies

Emily Hobhouse also oversaw the raising of funds and shipping of food and medicines to the women and children of Germany and Austria who were suffering as a result of the English Naval blockade.

Preaching for Peace

Numerous ministers were proclaiming from the pulpit: “That the guns may fall silent at least upon the night when the Angels sang.” Although these messages were officially rebuffed, and suppressed in the heavily censored media, many of the soldiers in the front-lines seemed to share these sentiments.

Read more here:


N. Jones is a Writer, Researcher, Historian and Literary Critic.

Continue to Part 3 ->

WWI: Early German Peace Proposals – Pt 2

Prolonging the War


h_h_asquith-4Right away, the war was ideologically charged by the Allies. During a tour of the United Kingdom, Prime Minister Asquith (in Edinburgh, in September) called the war a crusade against the arrogance of a single power trying to dominate the development of Europe. In Dublin, he declared the need to prevent small nations being annihilated by an overbearing power and claimed that the war was about the final abolition of militarism as the ruling factor in the relationships between states. In London, on 9 November, he spoke on the necessary abolition of Prussian militarism, and his fellow party member Lloyd George wanted to see the German people liberated from the hell of the military caste. The speech from the throne of 11 November, held that England would continue for as long as it could dictate the peace. All this was accompanied by sharp anti-German propaganda in the media. This even went so far that Germany was frequently called “Barbaria.” The British government was later not to leave their position, briefly detailed below.

germanstateIn France too, there were demands to break up Prussian militarism. In October 1944, Foreign Minister Delcassé, told the Russian ambassador that the aim of France was to annihilate the German Reich and to weaken Prussia’s military and political power as much as possible. In a similar vein, in a September memorandum for the French government, Sazonov spoke about the destruction of German power and the German arrogance to be predominant in Europe.

mapOn 5 September, the three Entente nations contractually committed themselves not to agree on a separate peace and to talk about their war goals in public only after having consulted each other. Several treaties were entered into regarding these goals, even with countries like Italy, which only joined the Allies later in the course of the war. The plans were about weakening Germany, destroying the Danube Monarchy and the Ottoman Empire, the latter which had joined the war in the autumn of 1914, on the side of the Central Powers.

After the important initial successes of the German army in the West, it could not be excluded that there soon would have to be talks about peace with the opponents. That’s why Chancellor of the German Empire, Bethmann-Hollweg, who stayed in the headquarters at the time, had a catalogue of possible goals compiled – which he expressly declared provisional – which he sent to the state secretaries of the exterior and the interior for revision on 9 September. The proposals required France to commit itself to reparations for the duration of 15 to 20 years, to be calculated so that she would not be capable of spending much on armament, but without calling for territorial sacrifices, except for the Briey ore basin. Moreover, she should be closely linked to Germany by means of a trade agreement. A different section talked about a Central European economic association under German leadership. Bethmann-Hollweg could most identify with this, but this paper did not present a firm agenda. With the Marne battle, the German offensive came to a halt, static warfare began, and hopes for the war ending soon had to be given up.

In mid-November, the Prussian War Minister, General von Falkenhayn, who now led the operations in the West, told the Chancellor that it was impossible to reach a decent peace as long as Russia, France and England stuck together. So they would have to break Russia away from the Entente coalition. Their thinking was that France probably would give in once Russia made peace. Russia should have to pay sufficient war reparations, but remain territorially intact, apart from slight corrections along the border. France should also have to pay reparations, yet receive an honourable peace, since Germany and France would have to amicably coexist again after the war… Bethmann-Hollweg fully agreed with these considerations. If Russia could not be prised away from the opposing coalition, the war might take a disastrous turn for Germany. If this didn’t happen, the prospect of the war ending only because of a general mutual weariness, without any decisive defeat of one party or the other, became likely. Bethmann-Hollweg kept to this opinion thereafter. Now, his aim in war was Germany’s self-assertion. He wanted to get guarantees for its safety, but he explained this only in general terms. However, Belgium and Poland were not to become the ground for preparing military action against Germany, ever again.

Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg

Shortly after the conversation of von Falkenhayn and Bethmann-Hollweg, the Danish King Christian X. offered (via the Danish ship owner and state councillor Hans Niels Andersen and the German ship owner Albert Ballin, a friend of Emperor Wilhelm II) his services in mediating a peace in London and St. Petersburg. Bethmann-Hollweg wanted to delay an answer so as to be able to improve the military position in the East, but von Falkenhayn and the Emperor considered an understanding with Russia to be urgent and gave Andersen a positive answer. During his visit to Petrograd, as the Russian capital was now called, in 1915, Andersen was told by Nicholas II, that he would never leave his Allies in the lurch, and that he was decidedly against a separate peace. The British and French ambassadors, who had come to know about Andersen’s visit, also tried to influence Sazonov in this sense.

When, following Bethmann-Hollweg’s request, Andersen went to Petrograd again in June and in August, he got the same answer. In November of 1914, the Ministry of State also tried to enter into talks with Japan, which had declared war on the German Empire in August and had annexed the German leased territory Kiautschou in the Chinese province of Shantung. The state secretary Jagow, thought that England could not have any interest in further strengthening Japan. This would offer the German Empire the opportunity to get into closer contact with Japan, provided Germany would accept the loss of Kiautschou.

Then, Japan could mediate with Russia. But this contact effort failed completely. In December 1914, the Japanese ambassador in Stockholm, Uchida, made it known to his German colleague via Swedish intermediaries, that Japan was not interested in communicating with Germany. In this decision, he acted not on orders by his government, but of his own initiative… so these contacts were fruitless. When in early 1916, Uchida first met with the German ambassador in person, he had to declare that, according to the London agreement of September 1914, there would be no separate peace and that the German Empire would have to succumb to the peace conditions imposed by the Entente.

woodrow wilson

Bethmann-Hollweg publicly declared several times that the Reich would be ready to enter into talks provided the offers were appropriate. When talking to Col. Edward Mandel House, a confidant of President Wilson, he declared his sympathy for a step towards peace made by the U.S. As the year went on, there were three more statements in the same vein. In October, he came to an understanding with the Austrian-Hungarian Foreign Minister, Count Stephan Burián, towards a joint step towards peace. This should happen at a point in time when it could not be construed as a sign of weakness. This was the case after the conquest of Romania. On 12 December, the Central Powers submitted the proposal, via neutral countries, to soon enter into peace talks. They would submit proposals to form an appropriate foundation for an enduring peace. They stated this publicly, Bethmann- Hollweg for instance, in the German Reichstag. The Allies brusquely refused and declared that Germany and its Allies would have to atone for everything they had committed, as well as providing reparations and security collateral.

They even refused the mediation offer Wilson made on 16 December. They said that currently it was impossible to enter into a peace reflecting their ideas. They wanted the restitution of Belgium, Serbia and Montenegro, the handing back of Alsace-Lorraine to France, the cession of all regions with Polish settlements to Russia and the breaking up of the Danube Monarchy and the Ottoman Empire. Also, they did not want to allow the Central Powers to take part in peace negotiations on equal terms.

In late January 1917, Wilson again offered the German ambassador his services for reaching a reconciliation between the warring opponents and asked to be informed about the German conceptions. He was told that Germany wanted to win a frontier protecting Germany and Poland against Russia in the future (as the Central Powers had recently proclaimed the ‘Kingdom of Poland’), an agreement about colonial matters, certain corrections concerning the border to France; and an economic and financial compensation between the warring opponents.

karl 1 in 1913

Following the death of Emperor Franz Joseph in November 1916, his great-nephew Karl stepped up to the top of the Habsburg Empire. After the failed peace offer of December 1916, Karl I was looking for peace options on private routes. In the spring of 1917, his brother-in-law Prince Sixtus of Bourbon-Parma, a Belgian officer, conducted several talks in Switzerland, Paris and London, which, however, did not achieve any results.


Meanwhile, on the battlefields, in between the trenches, in ‘No Mans Land’ – Soldiers negotiated their own peace quite easily and successfully, among themselves… The Germans in this instance too, initiated the peace talks – all it took was a little singing to each other. However, the Allied soldiers were receptive to this initiative and called a Truce, with the only negotiation being; “We won’t fire if you won’t fire.” If only they knew that they actually held all the power and it was the ‘Chain of Command’ that was their biggest threat…
See here: A Christmas Truce – 1914


Appreciation to Hans Fenske, Professor of Contemporary History, at Freiburg University (1977-2001) for all his scholarly compiled research.
Author of:

Der Anfang vom Ende des alten Europa (The Beginning of the End of Old Europe; The Allied Refusal of Peace Talks 1914-1919.


     <- Back – Part 1                     Next – Part 3 – >


N. Jones is a Writer, Researcher, Historian and Literary Critic.

WWI: The War Germany Did Not Want… Blamed For Entirely – Part 1

WWI – A War Germany did not want


Introduction

When handing over the peace treaty to the German delegation on 7 May 1919, French Prime Minister Clemenceau stated, very coarsely, that the most horrible war had been foisted on the Allies, and that now the time of reckoning had come. There would be no spoken negotiations, only remarks concerning the Treaty in its entirety would be accepted – if submitted in writing within two weeks. In his answer, German Foreign Minister, Brockdorff-Rantzau, rejected the accusation of exclusive responsibility and demanded that an impartial commission investigate the amount of guilt of all parties concerned.

The victorious Allied powers were not prepared to concede forming an impartial commission to look at the facts, but there were a number of neutral scholars who in their academic work, reached a view appropriate to the facts.
As early as 1914, the renowned American Professor of Law, John William Burgess, declared (after having studied the Blue Books presented by the warring parties), that the Entente held a far greater share of responsibility for the war than Germany and the Danube Monarchy (of the Austrian-Hungarian Empire). The Swiss scholar Ernst Sauerbeck, confirmed this view in 1919. According to his findings, the Entente had unleashed the war without need and turned it into what it became… the tomb of entire nations. He also accused the victorious powers of having, by means of the Versailles Peace Treaty, allowed the 1914-1918 war, to grow into the direst doom that has possibly ever threatened the world – that is, the War that began in 1939/1940 – better known as, World War Two.

In addition, experts from Norway, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Sweden and Finland, who in 1927, presented their expertise in a volume published by a Norwegian committee, investigating the issue of war guilt, assessed the share of guilt of the Central Powers as low. According to Hermann Aall, the committee’s secretary, Russia had provoked the war and Great Britain played a decisive role in its outbreak. Axel Drolsum, of the University of Oslo, stated that Germany in 1914, had been the only nation to have tried everything it could to keep the peace, but that it failed due to the will of the other powers to make war.

Moreover, we can make one reference to a voice from a victorious country. In 1924, the French journalist and former political diplomat, Alcide Ebray, recommended a thorough revision of the Treaty of Versailles. He claimed that the Czarist Regime held the decisive share of war guilt, while Germany acted in favour of a conciliatory position in Vienna and St. Petersburg, in 1914.


 

As it happened

balkans-map-copy2In Serbia, the ‘Radical Party’ of the appointed government, had been the decisive power since the ‘Bloody Officers’ Putsch’ back in 1903, more commonly called the ‘May Coup’ which saw the murder of the Royal Obrenovic couple, King Alexander I and his wife, Queen Draga – who was rumoured to be pregnant. The pair were dismembered, eviscerated and thrown out the window onto garden waste for public view. This saw the extinction of the ‘House of Obrenovic’ –  this coup d’etat, saw the Serbian throne gifted to the new ‘House of Karadordevic.’ The coup resulted and caused significant changes in Serbia’s relations with other European powers – the House of Obrenovic, was mostly allied with Austria-Hungary, while the new Karadordevic rulers had close ties with both Russian and French elements, receiving financial support from their powerful foreign sponsors.
The newly appointed radical government, ardently pursued a decidedly anti-Austrian foreign policy, which demanded that all Serbs be united within one state. The problem here was the fact that there were about as many Serbs living outside the country as there were within, particularly in the two provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina.  Although they nominally still belonged to the Ottoman Empire, they had been under Austrian-Hungarian administration since the Congress of Vienna in 1878.
When the Habsburg Empire annexed them in 1908, following an arrangement with Russia, there was a severe international crisis. When this was settled in March 1909, Serbia had to sign a treaty pledging to again maintain good neighbourly relations with the Danube Monarchy. But this did nothing to change Belgrade’s keen antagonism towards Vienna.
Firstly, however, Serbian activities were directed towards the South. The war against the Ottoman Empire (Italo-Turkish War), started by Italy in 1911 to conquer Libya, triggered Serbian talks with Bulgaria about whether to join arms against the Turks. After entering into an alliance (the Balkan League), the two states started the campaign in the autumn of 1912. Together with Montenegro and Greece, they took away from the Ottoman Empire, nearly its entire possessions on the Balkan during the First Balkan War.

This took place with the full assent of Russia, which wanted to get the Bosporus and the Dardanelles under its control and therefore, had a strong interest in effecting changes on the Balkans. Serbia enlarged its territory considerably towards the south. In November 1912, shortly after the beginning of the war, the French ambassador in Belgrade reported to Paris, that Serbia was set on bringing down Austria at its first possible chance. King Peter I (of Serbia) asked the Russian ambassador whether to enact the downfall of the Habsburg Empire then, or whether to wait. The Russian ambassador relayed this question to St. Petersburg, from where in February 1913 came the answer, that Russia (which was enduring its own attempted coup’s and political agitations) was not yet ready for a war against the Austrian-Hungarian Empire (the largest European empire, second only to Russia). Serbia should content itself with the present increase in territory for now, so that it could later, once the time was ripe, lance the Austrian-Hungarian abscess. Later, more statements of this kind were issued from St. Petersburg: Serbia would find its ‘Promised Land’ in Austria-Hungary and should prepare itself for the inevitable battle.

In the summer of 1913, Serbia (together with Greece and Rumania) turned against Bulgaria in a struggle over the recently conquered land. Russia backed Serbia, which was clearly a satellite of Russia, both having the same political elements within, for the same purposes.

At the beginning of 1914, the leadership in St. Petersburg saw Russia far better prepared for a war than the previous year. During a council of war, a decision was taken to use the upcoming war for occupying Constantinople and the Straits. The Russian military gazette, expressly declared the Czarist Regime’s readiness for war and in late March, the head of the military academy declared in front of Officers, that a war with the Triple Alliance was inevitable and would probably break out in the summer. The Belgian Ambassador in St. Petersburg reported to Brussels at the beginning of June, that it was to be expected that Russia would soon put its war tools to use. At the same time, Foreign Minister Sazonov exerted pressure in London, to quickly conclude the Marine Convention where negotiations had been going on for some time. Soon after, he travelled to Rumania together with the Czar. There, he asked the Prime Minister how Rumania would react should Russia see itself compelled by the events to start hostile actions.

saz-3St. Petersburg was well aware that in the case of a big European conflict, Russia would be firmly backed by France and Great Britain, as a Russian-French alliance had been in effect since 1894. The British-French understanding (Entente Cordiale) about Egypt and Morocco of 1904, was amended from 1905, by firm military agreements made by the General Staffs, where the Belgian military was kept informed. During his visit to England in September 1912, Sazonov (left) was assured by the British Foreign Minister, Edward Grey, (Signatory to the Secret Sykes-Picot Agreement), that in the case of a German-French war, Great Britain would support France by sea and by land and, try to deliver as destructive a blow as possible to German predominance. For Grey, Germany’s strong economic growth presented a grave threat, thus its weakening was a definite necessity for him.

FranzFerdinandWhen the Serbian secret society ‘Unification or Death’ (later, the ‘Black Hand’) planned the murder of Austrian heir, Duke Franz Ferdinand and his wife Sophie, Duchess of Hohenberg in 1914, the head of the Serbian intelligence service, Dragutin Dimitrijevic, leader of the Putsch of 1903 (which slaughtered King Alexander I and Queen Draga of Serbia), asked the Russian military attaché, whether this plan was convenient. St. Petersburg sent its consent, obviously being aware that the Danube monarchy would have no choice but to react harshly to the murder of their heir to the throne… being bait for war. Clearly, Russian political elements thought the moment had arrived to lance the Austrian-Hungarian abscess.

Ww1-military_alliances_1914The assassination on June 28 1914, took place in Sarajevo, Bosnia, the very south-eastern corner of the Austrian-Hungarian Empire, bordering Serbia. The Royal couple were riding in an open top car, when another vehicle travelling in their entourage was hit by a grenade. Later that same day the couple were cornered and shot in the street.

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Duke and Duchess Ferdinand riding in the open top car, the day of their assassination

In mid-June, German Reich Chancellor, Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg, asked the German ambassador in London to talk with Edward Grey about securing European peace. If another crisis was to erupt in the Balkans, Russia might react more decisively than before due to its now comprehensive rearmament. Whether this would result in a European clash, would depend entirely on Great Britain and Germany. He understood that if both states were to act as guarantors of peace, then war might be prevented. If not, any arbitrary marginal difference might light the war torch between Russia and Austria-Hungary. Grey’s response to the ambassador was placatory, but of course he did not tell him the truth.

After the Sarajevo murder on 28 June, Austrian Foreign Minister, Leopold Berchtold and General Chief of Staff, Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf, argued for an immediate strike against Serbia. The Hungarian Prime Minister prevented this. They agreed to demand of Serbia absolute clarification about the crime, but to hand over the respective note, only after the end of the impending French state visit to Russia. They were sure about German allegiance to Austria in case of complications, as a high-level public servant had been given this assurance when visiting Berlin on 5 and 6 July. The relevant German decision makers agreed that Russia would not intervene, so that the conflict could remain localised. That was a gross misjudgement.

During their stay in St. Petersburg on 20th through to the 23rd July, the French guests, President Poincaré and Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, René Viviani, repeated the assurance of absolute French solidarity in a war against Germany, which had been repeatedly given before. The British Ambassador, George Buchanan, had advised the guests to propose to Sazonov to, undertake “direct conversations” between Austria and Russia, as this was considered by Grey and others, to be the best possible solution. Poincare summarily vetoed the proposal, as he purportedly considered it “very dangerous” and the proposal was conveniently forgotten about – until later – as an intermediator, the German Ambassador, Friedrich Pourtales, arranged for the “direct conversations” between the two Empires.
Sazonov and Viviani agreed on 23 July, that everything must be done to counter the Austrian demand, as well as any request which might be construed as meddling with Serbian independence. During the July Crisis, the Austrian note to Serbia, called for an unequivocal condemnation of propaganda directed against the Danube Monarchy, and lodged claims as to how this should occur. It also asked for the participation of Austrian delegates in suppressing any subversive efforts directed against the Habsburg Empire, as well as in investigating the murder of the Duke and Duchess. An answer was expected within 48 hours – by the evening of 25 July.
On the same day of the 25th, German Ambassador Pourtales, meets Sazonov at the Railway Station at Krasnoe Selo and they both entered the train-car to St. Petersburg together. He advised of the benefit of “direct conversations” which led to a lengthy and useful interview between Austria-Hungary Ambssador to Russia, Frigyes Szapary and Sazonov, which was a result only due to the German Ambassadors’ initiative. July 27, Buchanan notes to Grey, “Sazonov does not wish reference to be made to the fact that it was at the suggestion of the German Ambassador that he proposed direct conversation with Austria.”

At first, the Serbian council of ministers showed a strong penchant to accommodate this request, and maybe it might have been even more pronounced, had Vienna made reference in its note, to the fact that after the murder of Serbian ruler, Prince Michael Obrenovic, in 1868, a Serbian prosecutor was permitted to conduct examinations in the Danube Monarchy. A call back to St. Petersburg was answered with the admonition to remain firm, which caused a change in opinion. Thus, Serbia mobilised its forces on the afternoon of 23 July and handed over a rather conciliatory and antagonistic answer three hours later – that the Austrian involvement in suppressing the subversive efforts and in investigating the murder of their Heir’ was denied. At once, the Danube Monarchy cancelled its diplomatic relations with Serbia. On the same day, Austrian Foreign Minister Berchthold, had it stated in St. Petersburg, that should a battle with Serbia be foisted on Austria, that it would not be about territorial gain, but about defence, and that Serbian sovereignty would not be touched.

nicky3-1914Czar Nicholas II, had already authorised informal mobilisation directly after the departure of the French guests on 24 July – these respective measures did not go unnoticed by German observers. The British navy was made ready for war on 26 July, and France called back all vacationers to their respective units. Under the terms of the Russian-French Alliance of 1894, joint assaults were obligated within 14 days of mobilisation and under International Law, mobilisation of a country’s forces, without consultation to neighbouring countries or those concerned, with or without formal Declaration, is classified as a ‘Declaration of War’. Formal Russian mobilisation against Austria-Hungary was ordered and declared on 29 July, 5 days after the informal mobilisation. The German Empire tried to mediate until the last minute. On 28 July, the day of the Austrian declaration of war against Serbia, Kaiser Wilhelm II, advised Vienna to stop in Belgrade, and even on 31 July, he urgently asked the Czar to avert the doom now facing the entire civilised world. Peace in Europe might still be kept if Russia stopped military actions threatening Germany and Austria-Hungary. Since Nicholas II did not cancel the mobilisation order, the German Empire informed Russia on the evening of 1 August, that it regarded the state of war to have occurred. After many unsuccessful attempts to receive recognition of a ‘Declaration of Neutrality’ from France, on 3 August, Germany also declared war on France.

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This was intended as a defensive pre-emptive measure. France could not be left to choose the moment for attack, after all, German plans for a war on two fronts envisaged first turning west, it could not defend both east and west frontiers at the same time. The breach of Belgian neutrality by Germany, which at that point in time was only nominal, gave Grey the welcome opportunity and excuse to lead Great Britain into war, on 4 August. Up to that point, public opinion had predominantly been in favour of steering clear of the strife on the continent. During the crisis, Grey had been very insincere about his intentions towards German diplomats, misleading most of his cabinet colleagues, the House of Commons and the general public.


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Appreciation to Hans Fenske, Professor of Contemporary History, at Freiburg University (1977-2001) for all his scholarly compiled research.
Author of:
Der Anfang vom Ende des alten Europa (The Beginning of the End of Old Europe; The Allied Refusal of Peace Talks 1914-1919.)


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N. Jones is a Writer, Researcher, Historian and Literary Critic

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