Despite all of Poland’s bravado and war cries to antagonise and instigate hostilities with Germany (see here), Poland Officials understood very clearly that they had no chance against Germany alone.
The French Military Command had in fact promised the Polish Military Ministry on May 19, 1939, that in the event of military aggression against Poland by another European power, France would come to its defense “no later than fifteen days after mobilisation”. This promise was sealed in a Military treaty signed between Poland and France… the Kasprzycki-Gamelin Convention.
It was named after the Polish Minister of War Affairs, General Tadeusz Kasprzycki and the Commander of the French Army, Maurice Gamelin, who both signed it. HOWEVER, it was only a military (army-to-army, not state-to-state) convention, making it arbitrary Martial Law if utilised, which was not authorised by any political enactment at all, as it was dependent on signing and ratification of Political Convention, for it to hold any international power.
The Treaty only became ratified on September 4, 1939, a day AFTER ‘France Declared War on Germany’… thus, no authoritative treaty was in place at the time of the French Declaration of War, or when Germany crossed the new-Polish border. The September 4 ratification was an illegal retroactive insertion, in attempt to justify the French Declaration of War and ultimate invasion of Germany. France had not been subject to any threat or attack from Germany whatsoever and, had in fact mobilised its military on August 26 – therefore France was the aggressor state and Germany had all right under both international and military law, to launch a defensive attack against France.
The ‘Polish-British Common Defense Pact’ also contained promises of military assistance in the event that either country was attacked by any other “European Country.” This built upon the previous agreement (March 1939) between the two countries (which included only third party and verbal assurances from non-ratified France), by specifically committing to military assistance in the event of an invasion...
As intended, when Germany crossed the new-Polish border to liberate the German people from the bestial Guerilla attacks, Poland was completely betrayed by its so-called democratic friends. Britain and France did in fact Declare War on Germany, on September 3, 1939… but did either come to assist their provocative war-bait, Poland? France invaded Germany in the west on September 7 – the so-called Saar Offensive (whose mobilisation began on August 26 – 6 days before Germany entered new-Poland) – advancing 8km’s in before stopping at German resistance and after the farcical Saar Offensive purposely fizzled, an almost 9 month Mexican Stand-off pursued – the Phony War.
The significance in this is that Hitler had concentrated most of the German military forces in the east at the time and France, having one of the strongest armies in the world, went nowhere near Poland and for the second time since the 1919 Versailles Treaty, breached German borders and militarily occupied foreign territory, in defiance of the Treaty.
Given such inaction by both France and Britain in regards to Polish defense assistance – as promised by Poland’s diplomatic friends – Hitler was able to take complete control over eastern Poland to liberate the German minority in less than 3 weeks… and then after the Allies ignored further Peace Proposals by Hitler, the Wehrmacht was mobilised west and the following year pushed both British and French forces back to their prospective territories – signing an Armistice with France and even allowing the British 2 unhindered days to evacuate 330,000 soldiers of the their cornered army, across the Channel from Dunkirk to England.
“I asked Joe Kennedy (US Ambassador in London, father of future US President, John F. Kennedy) about his talks with Roosevelt and Chamberlain in 1938. He said it had been Chamberlain’s belief in 1939 that Great Britain had nothing in its hands to fight and therefore wouldn’t dare go to war against Hitler… Neither the French nor the English would have made Poland a motivation for war, if they hadn’t been continually spurred on by Washington… America and the World-Jewry have driven England to war.”
∼ US Defence Minister, James Forrestal, 27/12/1945 in his diary (The Forrestal Diaries, New York, 1951, S 121 ff)
With the Polish army dealing with Germany in the west, Stalin cleverly decides to break the Soviet-Polish Non Aggression Pact of 1932. Poland is stabbed in the back by more diplomatic friends as Soviet forces pour in from the east too. The advancing Red Bolsheviks occupy the East, take prisoners and carry out massacres… the most famous being the Katyn Forest Massacre of an estimated 15,000 – 22,000 Polish officers, dignitaries and other intellectuals… blamed on Germans, of course!
Seven innocent German men hung for this Jewish Bolshevik crime and another three were sentenced to twenty years in the Jewish Gulag death camp system, never to be seen again – yet another result of Nuremberg’s Show Trial of purported justice.
(see: Katyn Massacre – Committed by Jewish Communists or Germans?)
Poland appeals to Britain for help, citing the Poland-British Defense Pact signed only a few weeks earlier! The Polish ambassador in London contacts the British Foreign Office pursuing clause 1(b) of the agreement, which concerned an “aggression by a European power” on Poland, stating it should apply to the Jewish-Bolshevik invasion also. The UK Foreign Secretary, Lord Halifax, responded with hostility stating that it was “Britain’s decision whether to declare war on the Soviet Union!”
The British and French betrayal of Poland in 1939 was not only dishonest, it was military stupidity of truly monumental proportions on Poland’s behalf, as they had plenty of warning in their negotiations and nothing clarified leading up to the 1st of September, in fact the clarity lessened the more time that went past. From Poland’s perspective, more betrayals would follow… Contrary to their assurances to the Poles, Britain and France agreed to allow the Bolshevik Soviets to occupy and keep eastern Poland which was taken over by the Red Army invasion on September 17, 1939, a non-provocative invasion – in breach of the 1932 Pact. The only purported compensation that Poland would claim, would be the ethnic cleansing of all Germans from lands that had been historically German for over 1000 years, creating at the end of the war, one of, if not the biggest humanitarian catastrophe’s known to the world… or perhaps mostly unknown?
A crowning humiliation of the Poles was the refusal of their British “friends” to allow the Free Polish Army to march in the victory parade at the end of the war, for fear of offending the Jewish-Bolshevik puppet government in Lublin.
During World War II, Poland suffered through one of the worst Soviet occupations in history, as well as civil war, Polish Nationalists fighting for sovereignty, Communist Partisans fighting against the Nationalists and the Germans, the Ghetto wars mixed with both, the NKVD liquidating ethnic Polish leaders by the thousands and many elements trying to reclaim the stolen German land again. After the war it had to suffer 45 years as a colony of the Communist Soviet Union as a result of the agreement signed by its friends, Britain and also America.
THE DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND
Great Britain and Poland
British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain stated in the House of Commons on March 31, 1939.
“As the House is aware, certain consultations are now proceeding with other Governments. In order to make perfectly clear the position of His Majesty’s Government in the meantime before those consultations are concluded, I now have to inform the House that during that period, in the event of any action which clearly threatened Polish independence, and which the Polish Government accordingly considered it vital to resist with their national forces, His Majesty’s Government would feel themselves bound at once to lend the Polish Government all support in their power. They have given the Polish Government an assurance to this effect. I may add that the French Government have authorized me to make it plain that they stand in the same position in this matter as do His Majesty’s Government.”
Having seemingly secured a guarantee, the Poles now took steps toward coordinating their defensive preparations with the British. On April 4, 1939, Poland’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Józef Beck, visited London for talks with Prime Minister Chamberlain and Lord Halifax, the Foreign Secretary. The content of these talks was described in an official communiqué sent from London to Warsaw on April 6th:
“The conversations with M. Beck have covered a wide field and shown that the two Governments are in complete agreement upon certain general principles. It was agreed that the two countries were prepared to enter into an agreement of a permanent and reciprocal character to replace the present temporary and unilateral assurance given by His Majesty’s Government to the Polish Government. Pending the completion of the permanent agreement, M. Beck gave His Majesty’s Government an assurance that the Polish Government would consider themselves under an obligation to render assistance to His Majesty’s Government under the same conditions as those contained in the temporary assurance already given by His Majesty’s Government to Poland.”
Shortly thereafter, a formal agreement between Poland and Britain was signed which clearly stated “If Germany attacks Poland His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom will at once come to the help of Poland.” This guarantee was also extended to Greece and Romania on April 13, 1939.
“In April, 1939 (four months before the outbreak of war), Ambassador William C, Bullitt, whom I had known for twenty years, called me to the American Embassy in Paris. The American Ambassador told me that war had been decided upon. He did not say, nor did I ask, by whom. He let me infer it… When I said that in the end Germany would be driven into the arms of Soviet Russia and Bolshevism, the Ambassador replied: “What of it? There will not be enough Germans left when the war is over worth Bolshevising.”
∼ Karl Von Wiegand, April 23rd, 1944, Chicago Herald American.
France and Poland
Whereas Britain’s supposed support of Poland was a relatively recent diplomatic development, Poland’s alliance with the French had a longer history. The first French efforts to buttress Poland against Germany went back to 1921, after dissecting German territory to Poland from the Versailles annexation in 1919. In that year, Raymond Poincaré, soon to become president of the French Republic, had stated “Everything orders us to support Poland: The [Versailles] Treaty, the plebiscite, loyalty, the present and the future interest of France, and the permanence of peace.” (See: Versailles: The Peace to End All Peace – Pt 4)
Eighteen years later and after Germany was rising from the depths of economic, geographic and the political oppression of Versailles – along with the worst hyperinflation ever imposed on a nation – the political agitators felt the time was ripe to begin putting their strategies in place. France apparently decided to build upon the vague defensive alliance it had formed with Poland in the wake of World War I. In mid-May of 1939, Poland’s Minister of War, General Tadeusz Kasprzycki, visited Paris for a series of talks. At issue for Kasprzycki, was clarifying the terms under which France would actually assist Poland militarily. These talks resulted in the Franco-Polish Military Convention which, according to historian Richard Watt, stated that “on the outbreak of war between Germany and Poland, the French would immediately undertake action against Germany, which would involve a major military offensive of the full French army to take place no later than fifteen days after mobilization.” However, as we have already ascertained above, this was never ratified before the French mobilisation, or the September 4 Declaration of War.
Polish historian Paweł Wieczorkiewicz interpreted that: “Polish leaders were not aware of the fact that England and France were not ready for war. They needed time to catch up with the Third Reich, and were determined to gain the time at any price.”
Publicist Stanisław Mackiewicz stated in the late 1940s: “To accept London’s guarantees was one of the most tragic dates in the history of Poland. It was a mental aberration and madness”.
On the same day when Britain pledged her support of Poland, Lord Halifax stated: “We do not think this guarantee will be binding.”
Another British diplomat, Alexander Cadogan wrote in his diary: “Naturally, our guarantee does not give any help to Poland. It can be said that it was cruel to Poland, even cynical.”
Polish-British military negotiations carried out in London, ended up in a fiasco. After lengthy talks, the British reluctantly pledged to bomb German military installations if the Germans carried out the same in Poland. Polish military leaders failed to obtain any more promises. At the same time, the Polish side tried again to negotiatie a military loan. Polish ambassador to Britain, Edward Raczyński, called these negotiations “a never-ending nightmare.”
Józef Beck in his memoirs wrote: “The negotiations, carried out in London by Colonel Adam Koc, immediately turned into theoretical discussion about our financial system. It was clear that Sir John Simon and Frederick Leith-Ross did not realize the gravity of the situation. They negotiated in purely financial terms, without consideration for the rules of the wartime alliance. As a result, the English offer gave us no grounds for quick reinforcement of our army.”
Finally, on August 2, 1939, almost 5 months after the initial assurances, Britain eventually agreed to grant Poland a military loan of £9 million, which was less than Turkey received at the same time. Poland had asked for a loan of £60 million back in May, when there was still a timely manner for preparations.
Polish Expectations, British and French Promises
Understandably, throughout the spring and summer of 1939, officials in Warsaw drew much gusto from the numerous assurances made by France and Great Britain, that Poland would not stand alone against Germany. For its part, the Polish military was under no illusion that it could not defend against a German assault for any more than a few weeks. Although Poland could field one of the largest armies on the European continent, its troops were only lightly armed in comparison to their German counterparts. In terms of modern weaponry, Poland was also severely lacking in armored vehicles and tanks, and its air force was hopelessly outmatched by the German Luftwaffe.
Strategically speaking, Polish Generals envisioned fighting the Germans at the frontier and then slowly retreating toward the south-eastern corner of the country, where an escape route into neighboring Rumania existed. The Poles thus fully expected the Germans to advance deeply into their country, but the western region of historically German land inhabited by German people, was the only interest to Germany initially. The sole hope of the Polish forces was that they could hold on long enough for French troops and British air power to attack Germany, along with a western border offensive to draw off enough German divisions, to allow a Polish counterattack. After all, France had promised in May to launch an all-out major offensive within two weeks of any German military activity.
Ultimately, the half-hearted Saar Offensive by the French, which mobilised on August 26 and invaded September 7, was halted after France occupied the Warndt Forest, 7.8 km2 of extensively-mined German territory. The French army failed to reach the Siegfried line.
The attack did not result in any diversion of German troops. The assured 40-division all-out assault never materialised. By the 12th of September, the Anglo French Supreme War Council gathered for the first time at Abbeville, in France. It was decided that all offensive actions were to be halted immediately! General Maurice Gamelin ordered his troops to stop “not closer than 1 kilometre” from the German positions along the Siegfried Line and of course, Poland was not notified of this decision. Instead, Gamelin informed the Polish Marshal Edward Rydz-Śmigły, that half of his divisions were engaging the German western divisions, and that the French advances had forced the Wehrmacht to withdraw at least six divisions from Poland… this was not true.
The following day, the commander of the French Military Mission to Poland, General Louis Faury, informed the Polish chief of staff, General Wacław Stachiewicz, that the planned major offensive on the western front had to be postponed from September 17 to 20. No clear reason was given at the time for this postponement, but it was, coincidently, the very same day the the Bolshevik Red Army invaded Poland from the east.
Expectations of swift Allied action were also repeatedly reinforced by the British. For example, during Anglo-Polish General Staff talks held in Warsaw at the end of May, the Poles stressed the need for British aerial assaults on Germany should Poland provoke war. The British responded with assurances that the Royal Air Force would attack industrial, civilian and military targets. General Sir Edmund Ironside then repeated this promise during an official visit to Warsaw in July. The Poles were reassured that Britain would carry out bombing raids on Germany once hostilities began.
The Reality: English and French Duplicity
At the same time that Allied politicians and military officers were promising to help Poland fight a war against Germany, events going on behind the scenes revealed that the British and French seriously doubted their ability to effectively aid the Poles and moreso, their intended reluctance of acting on their lip-service. Take for example discussions held by the British and French Chiefs of Staff between March 31 and April 4, 1939. A report issued at the conclusion of these talks entitled ‘The Military Implications of an Anglo-French Guarantee of Poland and Rumania’ stated:
“If Germany undertook a major offensive in the East there is little doubt that she could occupy Rumania, Polish Silesia and the Polish Corridor. If she were to continue the offensive against Poland, it would only be a matter of time before Poland was eliminated from the war. Though lack of adequate communications and difficult country would reduce the chances of an early decision. … No spectacular success against the Siegfried Line can be anticipated, but having regard to the internal situation in Germany, the dispersal of her effort and the strain of her rearmament programme, we should be able to reduce the period of Germany’s resistance and we could regard the ultimate issue with confidence.”
In short, while the Western Allies as a collective, planned on the eventual destruction of Germany and admit Germany would be fighting in ‘Resistance’ against the Allies in the west (aka – Defense), they also believed that Germany would crush Poland before turning her forces to the Allies western assault… in other words, they wanted a public excuse for a prolonged international war and, Poland would be the bait to produce it and to weaken the German defenses.
This situation of intended reluctance did not change substantially in the months leading up with the increasing provocations for hostilities, despite considerable information that western intelligence received concerning German military activity. Robert Coulondre, the French ambassador to Germany, sent a telegram to Paris regarding German troop movements. For example, on July 13, 1939, Coulondre wrote Georges Bonnet, the French Foreign Minister, that “This Embassy has recently reported to the Ministry numerous signs of abnormal activity in the German army and of Germany’s obvious preparations for the possibility of an impending war.”
Given what we now know about the months leading up to World War II, one cannot help but agree with the conclusion of Polish scholar, Anita Prazmowska:
“After granting the guarantee to defend Poland, the British (one might add the French — WFF) failed to develop a concept of an eastern front. The result was that the guarantee to Poland remained a political bluff devoid of any strategic consequence.”
THE FINAL DECEPTIONS: AUGUST 1939
By August 1939, with the attacks on the German minority in the stolen territory increasing, along with German refugees flooding out of Poland across the border and the Allies knowing all too well, that Hitler had exhausted almost all diplomatic avenues to resolve the issue (even though he was still attempting to negotiate in these final days, while Poland mobilised), as they had purposely ignored all his previous sincere attempts to resolve it peacefully; Allied preparations for war remained minimal at best. Britain, in particular, appeared to be paralysed by an inability to prepare for anything. Not surprisingly, the British had developed no coherent plan for offensive operations in the west, either in the air or on the ground. Add to that, they also refused requests from Paris to devote any air power to support the allegedly anticipated French all-out offensive into Germany’s west. And as far as aerial attacks on Germany were concerned, British military planners had actually retreated from their earlier promise to the Poles. By the end of August, thus on the very eve of Polish mobilisation and Germany crossing the border, the Chiefs of Staff in London had decided not to attack a wide array of targets in Germany. Rather they would limit aerial bombardment to “military installations and units which were clearly that, to the exclusion of industrial stores and military industrial capacity.” Of course, the Poles were not informed of this alteration in Britain’s approach to strategic bombing either.
Still, the Western Allies continued to put on the charade of their diplomatic efforts. Considering the relative lack of military preparations, these efforts were nothing but farcical. For example, on August 15, Robert Coulondre cabled Paris concerning a meeting he’d had with Ernst von Weizsäcker, the State Secretary in the Foreign Ministry in Berlin. During this one-hour conversation Coulondre told von Weizsäcker, “if any of the three Allies, France, England, and Poland, were attacked, the other two would automatically be at her side.” Furthermore, Coulondre then told Paris, “To guard as far as possible against this danger which appears to me formidable and imminent, I consider it essential:
(1) To maintain absolute firmness, an entire and unbroken unity of front, as any weakening, or even any semblance of yielding will open the way to war; and to insist every time the opportunity occurs on the automatic operation of military assistance.
(2) To maintain the military forces of the Allies, and in particular our own, on an equality with those of Germany, which are being continuously increased. It is essential that we should at the very least retain the previously existing ratio between our forces and those of the Reich, that we should not give the erroneous impression that we are ‘giving ground’.”
Again, Coulondre’s call for proper military preparations by France were in vain. Historian Anna Cienciala writes that General Maurice Gamelin, the commander of the French army, “had no intention to implement the French commitments made in the Military Convention [signed in May 1939].”
Even though Anna is correct in her analysis, Gamelin, instead, actually took steps to ensure that the Poles would in fact proceed to fight Germany, while not further committing French troops to action. In late August, Gamelin sent General Louis Faury to Warsaw as the head of the French Military Mission there. Prior to departing, Faury “was told that no date could be given [to the Poles] for a French offensive, that the French Army was in no state to attack, and that Poland would have to hold out as best she could. His mission was to see that the Poles would fight.” … as General Ironside had commented in July, “the French have lied to the Poles in saying they are going to attack. There is no idea of it.”
The British too, had no thought of attacking Germany, although they would continue the political charade that they would. The Royal Air Force (RAF) would not be deployed against German units in support of a French offensive and aerial bombardment in Germany would be limited only to clearly marked military installations (an unworkable proposition, both then and now, even with advanced technology). Yet London continued to issue its own false assurances to Warsaw by signing a formal Agreement of Mutual Assistance between the United Kingdom and Poland, on August 25, 1939, that committed Britain to, ‘Declare War on Germany’ should she invade Poland… coincidentally again, the very same day, the ‘Kings Speech’ was drafted to declare war, supposedly spoken in light of a German surprise invasion (which had not occurred at that time the speech was drafted)… A Declaration, which of course is just a formal verbal activity, not physical military activity.
Still, even if any of the promises and assurances by France or Britain were followed through with, none of them were to help the Poles in Poland!
Finally, in the latter days of August, London and Paris advised Warsaw to only partially mobilise her armed forces, as it was suggested that a lesser force would provoke the Germans less? Reportedly, the Polish Officials did as they were asked in regard to the military mobilisation, however the apparently less provocative Guerilla attacks on the German minority not only continued, but increased! Consequently, when the German advancement came, this made it much easier for the Wehrmacht to split Polish defenses and drive deep behind Polish lines.
From the evidence presented here, it is clear that neither France, nor Great Britain, had the slightest intention of actually coming to the assistance of their Polish war-bait puppet… and worse still, were encouraging Poland to not only provoke Germany, but to fight alone against an army it had no chance of defeating – some might explain it as, being thrown under the bus. Thus, by September 1, 1939, all the political and propaganda pieces were in place for the beginning of a general European war. It would be a war for which Great Britain and France were egregiously unprepared for, but knew in the future their powerful network within the Soviet Union and United States, would utilise their forces to bring the melee to its apex, both militarily and financially.
However, France and Great Britain did indeed honor one of their signatures and both ‘Declared War on Germany’ September 3, 1939. Nevertheless, this of course proved to be a hollow declaration that provided absolutely no help to Poland. It was only to serve as an international psychological precursor, to evoke the nations from around the world to send millions of their sons to unknown graves in Europe, so the continent could be handed to Communism on a red platter, soaked in blood.
What transpired is by now well known. The RAF did not even attempt to bomb German military installations because, as the Air Staff concluded on September 20:
“Since the immutable aim of the Allies is the ultimate defeat of Germany, without which the fate of Poland is permanently sealed, it would obviously be militarily unsound and to the disadvantage of all, including Poland, to undertake at any given moment operations … unlikely to achieve effective results, merely for the sake of maintaining a gesture.”
The Chiefs of Staff agreed, informing 10 Downing Street that “nothing we can do in the air in the Western Theatre would have any effect of relieving pressure on Poland.” And so the RAF decided instead to drop propaganda leaflets, to stir up excitement for a world war.
If Hitler and the coined ‘German War Machine’ were in fact on a quest for World Domination – as peddled by the fear provoking propaganda disseminated in these early days, or even as early as March and April 1939, as the many Officials discussed and alluded to the public – then the opportunity to prepare for and, to fight a brief, localised war against the German Army, to defeat it before its rearmament expanded any further, was therefore lost in September 1939… and the world has since been led to believe that the international network of Allied Military Strategists, as a collective, had not even discussed or contemplated this approach and simply overlooked the opportunity, especially when the interests of world security and peace was supposedly at stake?
By the same token, if the German World Domination agenda were true, they would have taken out France and Great Britain before giving them time for armament expansion during the Phoney War period, instead of later defensive actions against the Allies, ultimately signing an Armistace with France and giving the entire British Army safe travel home from Dunkirk.
Of course, what was actually lost, was millions of lives, which the noble Officials had poetically seduced the ears and hearts of the worlds peoples, as the very oxymoronic reason a world war must be fought for in the first place… Instead, what became was the intentional conditions to enable a communist take-over of Europe, which led to decades of Soviet occupation and the Cold War – hostile to the west – with the help OF the west.
As many Officials seemingly believed the German World Domination narrative, General Ironside commented in 1945, after much of Europe was in ruins, “Militarily we should have gone all out against the German the minute he invaded Poland. … We did not … And so we missed the strategical advantage of the Germans being engaged in the East. We thought completely defensively and of ourselves.”
“Berlin gave me the blues. We have destroyed what could have been a good race and we are about to replace them with Mongolian savages. And all of Europe will be Communist. It’s said that for the first week after they took it (Berlin), all women who ran were shot and those who did not were raped. I could have taken it (instead of the Red Army) had I been allowed.”
∼ General George Patton, July 21, 1945, The Patton Papers (a letter to his wife)
A brief and abrupt assault on a military threat before they build up arms, would be the strategy of any genuine Military tactic, in order to defeat a genuine threat… as any trained and experienced Military Commander would know. General George Patton was one such experienced Veteran, who sought to do just that in 1945 while the U.S. military was still unchallengeable. He ultimately saw the truth to the reasons for the war, what was unfolding in Europe and especially Berlin… that the Communists were taking over and he sought the permission to take Berlin and the Red army while there was still the chance – the permission never came. Instead, he was ordered to hold the U.S. Army back and wait to allow the ‘Gallant Red Army’ to occupy German, Czech, Rumanian, Hungarian and Yugoslavian territories.
“I understand the situation. Their (the Red Army) supply system is inadequate to maintain them in any serious action such as I can put to them. They have chickens in the coop and cattle on the hoof – that’s their supply system. They could probably maintain themselves in the type of fighting I could give them for five days. After that it would make no difference how many million men they have, and if you wanted Moscow I could give it to you. They lived on the land coming down. There is insufficient left for them to maintain themselves going back. Let’s not give them time to build up their supplies. If we do, then… we have had a victory over the Germans and disarmed them, but we have failed in the liberation of Europe; we have lost the war!”
∼ General George Patton, May 7, 1945.
The reasons for the various parties involvement in military hostilities, are wide and varied pertaining to their individual locations, pressures, impositions and manipulations. But when viewing any military action, Defense can look a lot like Attack, depending on who’s telling the story.
For Germany’s part, World Domination would have to be the most inane ‘Hollywood’ of excuses to incite people to travel to other lands to kill strangers. Germany fought in defense of heritage, home and its people. Initially for those Germans being terrorised in stolen land and ultimately in defense of all Europe, against the Conquering Communists who slaughtered millions of Europeans in the most callous and sadistic ways.
Finally, knowing that the powerful financiers of International-Jewry had their political network so stringently placed in Washington, London, Moscow and Paris, being the predominant ‘Advisors’ and ‘Think Tanks’ for the representatives of political decisions… why would they not ‘Advise’ against the total annihilation of the one nation state (besides Jewish-Bolshevik Russia) who had the largest Jewish population in Europe? Unless of course the suffering and persecution served an ulterior purpose? The answer to this can be found here…
In the commentary on the Anglo-Polish Alliance, Polish publicist Stanisław Mackiewicz wrote in his 1964 book, Polityka Becka:
“England does not need the existence of Poland, it has never needed it. Sometimes the British push us to fight against Russia, sometimes against Germany, as happened in 1939, when they managed to keep Hitler away from them for some time. After their so-called guarantees of March 1939, England was not interested in our army, it did not help us financially in our war preparations, and did not have the slightest intention to aid us during Hitler’s invasion of Poland (…) The guarantee of Poland’s independence, provided by England, was not a guarantee at all. On the contrary, it was a speculation, whose purpose was the fastest possible liquidation of the Polish state. England wanted Poland to fight Germany first, and to lose that war as quickly as possible, so that Germany would finally face Russia.”
Let us give Adolf Hitler the final say
Excerpt from his July 19, 1940 speech in the Reichstag:
“…Men of letters set out to portray decent men who desired peace as weaklings and traitors, to denounce opposition parties as a “fifth column,” in order to eliminate internal resistance to their criminal policy of war. Jews and Freemasons, armament industrialists and war profiteers, international traders and stockjobbers, found political blackguards: desperados and glory seekers who represented war as something to be yearned for and hence wished for.
It is to be ascribed to these criminal elements, that the Polish State was incited to assume a posture which stood in no relation to the German demands and even less to the consequences that resulted.
The German Reich, in particular with regard to Poland, has shown restraint ever since the National Socialist rise to power. One of the basest and stupidest provisions of the Versailles Diktat, namely the tearing away of an old German province from the Reich, already cried for a revision in and of itself.
But what was it that I demanded at the time? I must in this context refer to my own person. No other statesman could have afforded to propose a solution to the German nation in the way I did. It comprised merely the return of Danzig – that is to say of an ancient, purely German city -to the Reich as well as the creation of a connection of the Reich to its severed province. And this only pursuant to plebiscites conducted, in turn, under the auspices of an international forum. If Mr. Churchill or any other warmongers had but a fraction of the sense of responsibility I felt toward Europe, they could not have played so perfidious a game. For it need be ascribed solely to these vested interests in war, both within Europe and beyond, that Poland rejected the proposals, which neither compromised its existence nor its honor, and instead resorted to terror and arms. And it was truly superhuman restraint, without precedent, which for months led us, in spite of persistent assassination attempts on ethnic Germans – yes, indeed, in spite of the slaughter of tens of thousands of German Volksgenossen, to continue to search for a path toward peaceful understanding. For what was the situation like? One of the creations of the Diktat of Versailles, the most divorced from reality, a bogy, inflated militarily and politically, insulted a state for many months, threatening to beat it, to fight battles before Berlin, to smash the German Army to pieces, to transfer the border to the Oder or the Elbe; it went on and on. And this other state, Germany, watches the goingson patiently for months, although one sweeping gesture would have sufficed to wipe this bubble – inflated by stupidity and arrogance – off the face of the earth.
[Again] On September 2, this struggle could yet have been avoided. Mussolini made a proposal to put an immediate end to the hostilities and to negotiate peacefully. Though Germany saw its armies advancing victoriously, I accepted this nonetheless. But the Anglo-French warmongers needed war, not peace.
And they needed a long war, as Mr. Chamberlain put the matter at the time. It was to last for at least three years, since they had in the meantime invested their capital in the armament industry, bought the necessary machinery, and now needed the precondition of time for the thriving of their business and for the amortization of their investments. And besides: what are Poles, Czechs, or other such nationalities to these citizens of the world?….”
Full speech here
N. Jones is a Writer, Researcher, Historian and Literary Critic.